

668 must liberate Taiwan." Theaters and cinemas
 527 were crowded, and continuous and varied shows--
 each no doubt with its ideological message --
 were performed in the "Working People's
 Palace of Culture." Further innovations
 symbolic of the new order were an exhibition
 by Soviet skaters, chess tournament, the
 finals of the city soccer tournament, enter-
 tainments by workers' amateur troupes. 30

- 668 The cities have been cleaned up and en-
 514 larged, and building has apparently proceeded
 rapidly, although improvements in housing
 probably mainly affect the industrial workers,
 the favored class in the drive for industrializa-
 tion. 31 Yet the Rostow study indicates that there
 has been no real increase in wages for the urban
 worker. 32 His diet remains poor, his work
 hours long. But since the Party is anxious to
 recruit from urban workers, he does have
 opportunity to rise in life through Party work.
 Many industrial workers probably do feel some
 sense of identification with the most rapidly
 expanding sector of the Chinese economy. This
 668 identification and the opportunities offered by
 ● 183 the Party are probably slowly changing the goals
 of the urban worker. He may be less interested
 than he was once in returning to a plot of land

30. NCNA dispatches, Peking, Jan. 21
 and 24, 1955, and SCMP, 974, Jan. 22-26, 1955,
 pp. 31-32.

31. Rostow, op. cit., p. 160.

32. Ibid., pp. 160-61.

- ⁶⁶⁸₁₈₃ in the country, where economic opportunities are increasingly restricted. He knows, after attending one Party meeting, that the peasantry is no longer the favored class in the Chinese economy.

⁶⁶⁸₅₆₅ The elite of the towns and cities are the functionaries of the government and Party. We know little of the pattern of their private lives. But, if the badge of the old Chinese bureaucratic elite was a leisurely and cultivated air, the badge of the new is a daily calendar of meetings, a full briefcase, and an air of purposeful, energetic activity. Their incomes permit their families a life somewhat easier than that granted the rest of the urban population, but they are constantly disciplined, watched by their colleagues, obliged to meet work quotas, and forced to submit to continuous indoctrination and re-indoctrination. Party and government workers are urged to use the New Year holiday to plan their work for the year to come.

The bulk of the old middle class may have survived, but its activities have been increasingly restricted by government controls and the growth of government producing and marketing facilities. They are a tough and tenacious group, but their old comfortable life is already threatened and, ³³ as a class, they are scheduled for extinction.

33. Rostow, op. cit., pp. 162-64.

II. BASIC ATTITUDES

123 One of the principal reasons for the stability and long life of the old order in China was its special homogeneity. The imperial government fostered uniformity of attitudes and values, and Chinese statesmen believed this to be a more binding, durable, and cheaper cement for the imperial order than government coercion. Old China was primarily a way of life, a system of values and attitudes, and on this premise the state was organized. A foreigner who wished to become "naturalized" had only to show that he accepted Chinese attitudes and values; this he did by adopting Chinese dress and speech and patterns of behavior.

This characteristic of the old order is one of the reasons why we find no important regional variations in basic attitudes. The other reason is that the Communist government is as determined, in enforcing a uniformity of values and attitudes, and far more resourceful than was the imperial government of the past.

There are, however, certain local variations in temperament and ethos which effect, to a minor degree, the basic attitudes and values. A few of these will be noted. For the variant attitudes and values of ethnic and religious minorities, see the chapters on Ethnic Groups and Religion.

There have been profound changes in basic attitudes over the last century and particularly during the last five years. Change has been brought about by two factors. The first is the disintegration of the old social and political order resulting from its failure to adapt itself to the problems and pressures of the modern world. Consequently, people became critical of the older attitudes and, in increasing numbers, adopted newer "modern" attitudes and values which were considered better suited to a modern China. The second is the power of the Communist state, which, in the last five years, has been used to inculcate a new and uniform set of values and attitudes. 183

These two factors are closely interrelated. Thus, the Communists have been making a sympathetic use of individual and group-dissatisfaction with the old order to inspire and promote the acceptance of the new attitudes and values; the latter's appeal has been particularly strong with youth -- especially adolescents -- and with women who have been taught to regard the old social order as tyrannical and oppressive. The following will illustrate this last point:

Co-operative agriculture has
organization,
and women are not left out.
In the old society we were badly
mistreated,
but the new society teaches
friendship and love. 29

29. Fu-nu San-tzu Ching [Three-character Classic for Women], Hsin-hua Publishing House, 1950, Op. 21. [cont'd next page]

183

In addition to capitalizing on discontent, the Communists have been making a peculiar use of traditional attitudes and values. Certain values from the old order still have a strong emotional appeal for the Chinese people. And the Communists seek to make the new order more acceptable by associating some of its elements with selected elements from the traditional culture. For example, they insist that as a guiding principle of personal behavior the idea of "struggle" (tou-cheng) must replace that of "harmony" (ho).³⁰ People are taught to struggle for self-perfection and to engage in class struggle, in the struggle for a new China, and in the struggle against deviation even when this involves attacking their friends. This is utterly contrary to the old ideal of harmony in personal relations, an ideal that means in practice a comfortable adjustment to one's natural and human environments. Yet in urging all to struggle, the Communists insist that the ultimate goal of all struggle is the Ta-t'ung-ching-yü -- the traditional utopian ideal of a harmonious, frictionless social order.³¹

[29. from previous page] Three-character rhymed verses were widely used in traditional China for the indoctrination of the young.

30. Cf. Arthur F. Wright, "Struggle vs. Harmony: Symbols of Competing Values in Modern China," World Politics, Vol. VI (Oct. 1953), pp. 31-44.

31. Mao Tse-tung, On People's Democratic Dictatorship, 3rd ed., Peking Foreign Languages Press, 1950, pp. 16-17. For Mao, of course, term means ultimate world-wide Communist utopia.

- 183 In discussing certain attitudes and values we should bear in mind that the power of the old and the appeal of the new vary not according to regions but according to social groups. It was among the population of modern cities like Shanghai that the old values were first challenged by the pressures of modern problems, but among the peasantry and rural gentry, despite many dis- 32 contents and tensions, the old ways still prevailed. Intellectuals and members of the new industrial and commercial groups were the first to discard traditional attitudes and adopt Western values; among other groups this process was slower. These variations affect Communist tactics to the extent that different kinds of persuasion are used with different groups. But the final goal is adoption of the attitudes and values decreed by the Communist leadership.

A. Good and Bad

- 183
579 In traditional China the prevailing belief was that man was inherently good and that social harmful behavior occurred only when men lacked guidance or were placed in adverse circumstances. For example, if the ruler of the state or his officials or the father of the family failed to provide for the basic physical needs of individuals, their dependents were likely to rebel. Or if those in authority failed to provide instruction, particularly if they failed to set an example in conduct, then those subordinate to them would have no guideposts to the good and would fall into evil ways.

32. For example, as late as 1941-43, one anthropologist found in rural Yunan that the traditional value of hsiao (filial submission) was still, [cont'd next page] -205-

Bad conduct was not, as in the West, violation of the laws of God but deviation from the age-old norms of acceptable social behavior. Specifically, behavior was categorized as "bad" if it went against such prescribed norms as the following: (1) hsiao, filial submission to fathers and elders; (2) chung, loyal and submissive devotion to superiors; (3) hsin, good faith among friends and associates; (4) jen, benevolence or fellow-feeling which should inform all social relationships; (5) i, righteousness in one's dealings with others; (6) Li (good form), accepted procedures in human relations; (7) lien, integrity; and (8) ch'ih, sense of shame.

The laws of imperial China provided heavy punishments for violations of these norms; the most heinous crimes were those against hsiao, filial submission. Yet the ideal in the application of law was not blindfold justice but punishment administered with due regard for "human feeling [jen-ch'ing]" and for the specific circumstances surrounding the crime. This attitude is illustrated in the old proverb: "There is one thing worse than a dishonest official and that is an honest official,"

32. [continued] as it had been for centuries, "the foundation stone...of social organization,...the measuring stick of all behavior and of the worth of the individual.

183 which expressed disapproval of a rigorous enforce-
671 ment of rules and regulations, of an enforcement
that fails to take into account "human feelings."³³
The criteria for judging behavior as good or bad
were therefore neither religious nor legalistic,
but were the prevailing norms in the community,
the customary practices sanctioned by tradition
and ratified by a high degree of community con-
sensus.

183 In traditional Chinese goodness could be
579 cultivated through practice, study, and contempla-
tion. Confucianism held that the path to goodness
was open to all, that those who attained a high
order of goodness should be a moral elite, a group
of exemplars for others. This moral elite was
also, in Confucian theory, the group which should
hold and exercise political power and enjoy the re-
wards of status and wealth. This nation sanctioned
the long political dominance of the scholar-official.

The Chinese Communists have laid out new
standards of good and bad. In the words of their
leading theoretician; their aim is "...to reform
mankind into the completely selfless citizenry of
a Communist society."³⁴ In setting the new
standards the Communists have consciously and un-
consciously selected concepts from traditional moral

33. Ruth Bunzel and John Weakland, "An
Anthropological Approach to Chinese Communism,"
Columbia Univ. Research in Contemporary Cultures,
New York, 1952, pp. 80-81. Hereafter cited as
Bunzel-Weakland.

34. Liu Shao-ch'i, "The Training of the Com-
munist Party Member," first presented as a speech
in 1939; cf. trans. in Boyd Compton, Mao's China,
Seattle, 1952, p. 146.

183 ideas; some have been discarded, others have
597 been taken over with little adaptation; still others
linger between the lines and in the implications of
Communist utterances.

The old virtues associated with the tra-
ditional family have been discarded because the old
family system has been dissolved, its functions
taken over by the modern conjugal family on the
one hand and by state and Party organizations on
the other.³⁵ Familial virtues are castigated as
"feudal" and as backward features of what the 36
leadership calls "the squalid old society of China."

The basic Marxist dogma that the individual
is molded by his class position and, indirectly,
by the "stage of the society into which he is born,
has a good deal in common with the Confucian
view of the prime importance of environment in
the formation of character. Thus the Communist
effort to create a new society, in both traditional
Chinese and Marxist terms, will create favorable
environment for the development of individual
goodness. But the "goodness" expected is different:
"To sacrifice the individual for the sake of the
Party, for the sake of the class, for national libera-
tion, or the liberation of mankind, even to sacri-
fice one's own life without the slightest hesitation,
with a feeling of happiness -- this is the highest

35. J.M.H. Lindbeck, "Communist Policy
and the Chinese Family," Far Eastern Survey, #20,
(July 25, 1951), pp. 137-41.

36. Liu Shao ch'i, quoted in David S. Nivison,
Communist Ethics and Chinese Tradition, Stanford
University, 1954, p. 15. Nivison's study will appear
in symposium, Thought and Officialdom in China,

expression of Communist morality... "37

183
599

This is the basic principle: utter subordination of the individual to the Party. But when we examine some of the personal qualities which the Communists want, we find them linked in many ways to Chinese tradition. The good Communist is "able to love others and hate others." (A phrase from the Analects of Confucius); that is, he never injures his comrades for his own benefit, but vigorously fights the enemies of the revolution. Towards his comrades his attitude is one of "genuineness and sympathy." (Analects) He does "nothing to others that he would not have done to himself." (Analects) He "grieves before all the rest of the world grieves and is happy only after all the rest of the world is happy." (Buddhist ideal of the Bodhisattva-savior, adapted by an eleventh century Confucian thinker.) He "has no individual apprehensions or private desires to obscure and pervert his investigation of things and understanding of true principles," (a restatement of the late Confucian view of purity of mind as being necessary for true knowledge.) 38

Univ. of Chicago Press, early in 1956.

37. Liu Shao-ch'i "On the Training of the Communist Party Member," in Compton, op.cit., p. 110. Nivison, op.cit., p. 18, points out that this prescription is close to the classic descriptions of the traditional virtue of chung -- absolute loyalty to superiors.

38. These characterizations are all from authoritative treatise by Liu Shao-ch'i, ibid., translated in Compton, op.cit., pp. 108-55. Traditional sources are identified by Nivison, op.cit., pp. 19-20.

183
5M To attain these and other "good" qualities, the Communist, like his Confucian ancestors, is to pattern his character after approved models and to subject himself to intensive self-cultivation. In traditional China, the models of character and behavior found in the classics and histories were to be studied and followed by individuals who manifested a particular virtue, filial piety, for example, were required reading. Now the Communists set up Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Mao as personal models; everyone is capable of attaining the great qualities of these revolutionary geniuses if he tries.³⁹ Even selected heroes from China's "feudal past" are recommended as models.⁴⁰ Such models are presented in fiction, in textbooks, in newspapers, and young and old are urged to emulate these heroes. In addition, "model" workers, farmers, soldiers are feted and publicized, and their pictures and idealized biographies appear in all propaganda media.

Self-cultivation consists of being unremittingly conscious of one's faults and of Communist ideals, of being ever alert, in study and action, to the recrudescence of "bad" attitudes which are the residue of one's pre-Communist education. Liu Shao-ch'i stresses the development of consciousness in the individual; through consciousness one is free from the determining forces of

39. Liu Shao ch'i, op.cit., q quoted in Nivison, p. 16.

40. Ch'en Sang, "Tang-hsing Yu Ssu Cheng-huo," [Party Nature and Private Life], in Lun Tang Yu Ko-jen [On the Party and the Individual] by Ch'en Po-ta and others, Hong Kong reprint, 1948, p. 3, cited in Nivison, op.cit., p. 76, note 16.

- 183 history and environment and becomes capable of
511 working creatively for the aims of the new society.

This emphasis on consciousness is connected with both traditional ethics and Soviet psychology. On the one hand, it has "an obvious affinity to the Neo-Confucian notion of cultivation as freeing the individual from the tyranny of blind habit and unconscious selfish motivations."⁴¹ On the other, it reflects the recent development of Soviet psychology; from an earlier denunciation of consciousness as "smacking of bourgeois idealism" the Russians have come to the view that "consciousness is a central process in making man capable of forging his own destinies."⁴²

The list of bad qualities denounced by Communism is long; liberalism, formalism, bureaucratism, opportunism, and a dozen others are being continually denounced. How does one rid oneself of these vices? The following formula, here used against the vice of individualism, is typical:

"The methods transmitted by the ancients for raising oneself out of the vulgar state and entering sagehood, becoming a Buddha or a Taoist spirit, all required one to go through a long period of discipline. If we want to shed the early form of individualism and acquire a spiritual form of collectivism, we must cultivate and discipline ourselves over and over; ...we should continually ask ourselves this question: 'Am I or am I not still guilty of individualism?' If we have a thought, utter a sentence, walk a step or do a thing, we should listen for

41. Cf. Nivison, op.cit., p. 15.

42. [next page]

the response of others [the group]: this is -- or is not -- individualism."⁴³ 183
577

The last sentence quoted above introduces the notion of group criticism and group pressure, which is the universal Communist device for fostering approved behavior and eliminating the disapproved. Members of Party organizations, professions, government bureaus, and all other groups meet continually for criticism and self-criticism, and this whole process reaches the population through the publication of confessions and criticism in the mass media. The study meetings, popularly called "struggle meetings," are characterized by an atmosphere of tension and fear. Confessions of deviation or defect are made by individuals and analyzed or "exposed" by the group; criticisms are leveled at individuals and promises of reform are exacted.⁴⁴ This appears to be a device of deadly effectiveness for making individuals conform to the new Communist standards for thought and behavior.

B. Time, Change, and Causation

829

In traditional China, time and change were

42. Cf. Raymond Bauer, The New Man in Soviet Psychology, Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press, 1952, p. 164 and passim. The quotations are from Jerome Bruner's foreword to this volume, xxii.

43. Lun Tang Yu Ko-jen [On the Party and the Individual], cited in Nivison, op.cit., pp.45-46, and note 66.